I’ll confess to not being especially interested in these stamps. The circumstances behind their creation are quaint and curious, and they’re enormously striking in their crude appearance. But they’re an unnecessary contrivance of the most obvious sort – as was cheerfully admitted to at the time by Sir Percy Cox, the driving force behind them. Granted, they were a propaganda contrivance, which is several steps above a collector-targeted contrivance. But the exercise was entirely insincere, and most of the stamps went straight from the post office counter to collectors; facts which, when combined with the high prices of surviving specimens, hardly inspire me to acquire a full set of them. Not that I’d have the money to, in any event. I have four of these (out of twenty-five principal catalogue numbers), and I don’t plan to obtain any more of them. I think what I have is enough to get the visual gist of the issue, at any rate.

Another relevant consideration is that these stamps have recently been given a full review in Freddy Khalatschy’s lavish and comprehensive “Baghdad in British Occupation” – the Story of the 1917 Provisional Stamps. If you’re interested in the Baghdads I would point you directly there. I don’t want to render myself obnoxious by covering too much of the same ground (that book draws heavily from the India Office papers, which are also my main source), so I’ll try to stick to the very salient points here.

Background and development

After its grievous defeat in April 1916 the Indian Expeditionary Force spent the rest of the year recovering its strength, before launching a fresh campaign in December. General Sir Stanley Maude, the new British commander in the theatre, made a strong thrust towards Baghdad, and, after much military endeavour, captured the city on 11 March 1917. This victory also put (approximately) the southern half of the Baghdad vilayet into British hands.

Baghdad seems to have been rather neglected by the Ottomans: De Gaury describes the city, at the time of its capture by the British, as having only one proper street, which had been knocked directly through it only a couple of years earlier at the insistence of the German army.¹ Sir Arnold Wilson wrote that Baghdad was “notable among Turkish cities for its lack of amenities”.²

The post and telegraph offices in the city had been thoroughly ransacked, and denuded of stamps, during the Ottoman retreat.³ Things were cleaned up sufficiently for a civilian postal service to be resumed on 29 March,⁴ headquartered in the Ottoman-era head office. Initially letters could only be posted and collected at the head office, but on 20 April postmen began work within Baghdad city.⁵ The postmen’s radius was extended to Kadhimiya and Mu’adhdham on 29 April, and the old Ottoman postboxes (repainted British red, naturally) came back into service in June.⁶ From June postal services were extended further, but the head office in Baghdad remained the only actual post office in the vilayet for the rest of 1917 (at minimum).⁷

Throughout this period the carriage of mail was free, and no stamps were used.⁸ Onto this stage boldly strode Sir Percy Cox, at that time Chief Political Officer with the Indian Expeditionary Force. Cox, I am sorry to report, was a stamp collector,⁹ and seems to have brought a Gibbons catalogue with him to Mesopotamia.¹⁰ He had an eye for the possible uses and abuses to which postage stamps could be subjected, and had perhaps already dabbled in the creation of propaganda overprints (see appendix). On 1 April, General Maude cabled these fateful words to the Viceroy, no doubt at Cox’s instigation:¹¹

(Note the “reference postage stamps…” at the start – this appears to be picking up on an earlier thread not preserved in the India Office papers. Presumably there was a discussion culminating in the decision to allow free stampless postage in Baghdad.)

The Viceroy was unenthusiastic about the proposal. “No special surcharge seems called for,” he cabled to Maude and Cox on 15 May, “unless H. M. Government wish to advertise our occupation of Baghdad or emphasise temporary character of our administration.” ¹² The Foreign Office was also sceptical, holding “…apprehensions that the introduction of a special stamp for Baghdad would be misunderstood by the Arabs or might be regarded as inconsistent with the avowed policy of H. M.’s Government.”¹³

The India Office thought it a good idea to have the Baghdad vilayet use different stamps to the Basra vilayet,¹⁴ but it questioned whether the civilian postal service in Baghdad couldn’t just use Indian stamps overprinted “I.E.F.”, if those weren’t being used for civilian purposes in Basra. It agreed with the Foreign Office that a special stamp for Baghdad “might conceivably give rise to misconceptions as to the intentions of H. M.’s Government in regard to the future administration of the Vilayet”.¹⁵ Accordingly, the Under-Secretary of State for India wrote to the Foreign Office on 19 May to recommend the use of Indian stamps overprinted “I.E.F.” for all postal purposes, military and civilian, within Baghdad vilayet,¹⁶ a view to which the Foreign Office concurred.¹⁷

On 29 May the India Office cabled Cox: “[subject:] stamps for Baghdad. Indian stamps surcharged “Indian Expeditionary Force” may be used until further orders in all post offices in Baghdad Vilayet, including any civil post offices that may be established in Baghdad city or elsewhere.”¹⁸

In September, after the stamps had been issued, Cox claimed that, because the 29 May India Office telegram didn’t contain an explicit order that the Baghdads not be issued, he had taken that as a tacit approval to proceed with them. He had, he said, interpreted the 29 May telegram as merely an answer to the final sentence of his 1 April telegram: “please say whether English or Indian stamps are to be used after above supplies [i.e. the Baghdads] have been exhausted and with what if any over-print.”¹⁹

Whether this was a good-faith misreading of the India Office’s intentions, or a lawyerly way of getting around them, is probably not for me to answer. Moreover, what the India Office’s intentions actually were, is an obscure matter to answer, as will now be seen.

As is well known, George V was a devout stamp collector. He quickly became aware of the original proposal to issue the Baghdads, and the India Office received a polite letter from Buckingham Palace on 3 April: “…I write to say that the King hopes you will secure for him a set of this proposed issue of stamps. As you know, the King likes a corner set of 4 of each variety.” ²⁰ The Palace picked up the matter on 16 July, and wrote again to the India Office to enquire about when the stamps would be sent to the King.²¹ This prompted the India Office to telegram Cox on 1 August, asking him when the “surcharged Turkish stamps” would be ready.²²

Cox could only have taken this as confirmation that his interpretation of the 29 May India Office telegram was correct. Why the India Office sent this message, when they were clearly against the idea of the Baghdads, as demonstrated by their reaction to Cox’s telegram of 8 August (below), is highly mysterious. There’s a small handwritten note (frustratingly, not wholly legible to me) in the India Office papers, dated 17 and 19 July, which suggests internally there was some confusion on the topic.²³ Possibly, the simple answer is that the point was too trivial for anybody to give it their full attention, leading to this inconsistent reaction. “It is a small matter”, as an India Office official noted on 18(?) July.²⁴ The 1 August telegram seems to have also assumed Cox was going to produce Indian stamps overprinted “Baghdad in British Occupation” after the Ottoman ones – a simple misreading of the prior correspondence, which again suggests that nobody had their full eyes on the matter.²⁵

At any rate, Cox cabled back on 8 August:²⁶

His wording (as noted by Khalastchy²⁷) implies that the stamps were ready for issue by 8 August, and were being held back only because the “I.E.F.” stamps hadn’t yet arrived. The issue surely couldn’t have been produced in a week, which must mean production had started earlier than 1 August when Cox received “confirmation” from the India Office.

Cox’s 8 August telegram seems to have caused some consternation in London. A (missing) internal note of 10 August recorded the India Office’s belief that “…the Turkish stamps overprinted in accordance with [Cox’s] suggestion, had not been, and would not be, issued.”²⁸ On the same date, they sent a telegram to the Viceroy, with Cox in copy, in which “it was stated that no “Baghdad” overprinting was intended.”²⁹ That this telegram entirely contradicts the sentiment of their 1 August telegram is not mentioned or explained. Perplexingly, the Under-Secretary for India wrote to Buckingham Palace also on 10 August: “…the unexhausted stock of Turkish stamps found at Baghdad, which it was proposed… to issue with the over-print ‘Baghdad Under British Occupation’. These stamps now appear –for reasons which are not too obvious– never to have been issued; and presumably they never will be.”³⁰

In the space of ten days the India Office had endorsed the stamps, and then simultaneously un-endorsed them and complained to the King that Cox was subjecting their issue to mysterious delays. If there is a consistent thread running through all this, I do not have sight of it.

What Cox made, or was supposed to have made, of all this confusion is unclear – but he decided to keep his head down and press on with the issue. He cabled the India Office on 9 September to inform them that the Baghdads had been issued,³¹ and on 16 September, in response to India Office queries, he offered the interpretation of their 29 May telegram mentioned above. The India Office was clearly perturbed by this,³² but there seems to have been no repercussions for anybody, at least on the evidence in front of me. Cox wasn’t reprimanded, nor was anybody at the India Office, and by the end of September discussions between the India Office, Foreign Office and Cox had already moved on to the proposed “Iraq in British Occupation” issue.

Production

When these stamps were produced is unclear, beyond that Cox had had the idea by 1 April, and they were issued on 1 September. As mentioned, Cox’s telegram of 8 August implies production was complete by that date. Cox’s 1930 account of the stamps in Arnold Wilson’s Loyalties implies that production was carried on all the way through August, which is perhaps less likely.³³ In his initial account of the stamps, dated 15 September 1917, Cox states that the process of gathering up stamps began “some weeks” after the city was captured. ³⁴

The raw material, “a curious mixture of old and recent issues”,³⁵ was got from “local merchants or in outlying post offices”, there being few stamps available in Baghdad city.³⁶ 14,580³⁷stamps were gathered up: most presumably by force, although some were bought from locals.³⁸ Cox, sensibly, elected not to use any types where he had under sixty examples³⁹ – the reason for this isn’t given, but no doubt the intention was to avoid creating exorbitant rarities. For the same reason, “the most rigorous precautions were taken… to avoid detectable errors”.⁴⁰ Not entirely successfully.

The top value of the 1914 Ottoman pictorial series, printed by Bradbury Wilkinson & Co., bore a finely-engraved portrait of the Ottoman Sultan. In his 1930 account, Cox claimed that he possessed sufficient quantities of this stamp to justify overprinting it, but “on reference to the Secretary of State we were informed that it was the wish of his Majesty King George that this stamp should not be overprinted.” ⁴¹ I think Cox’s memory mistook him here. This same exchange –the probity of putting an overprint on the Sultan’s head– took place in 1918 in connection with the occupation issue, and I think this is what Cox is recalling. His original system for the occupation issue dated 19 December 1917 included the Sultan’s head stamp,⁴² which he surely wouldn’t have included if he had been warned off using it in August. This is all set out on the following page.

The mechanism of overprinting was described by Cox in detail, and I think this is worth giving in full:⁴³

There seems to be some disagreement over the amount of operations employed – Cox, who was in a position to know, says four, but Gibbons and Cockrill⁴⁴ say three. I assume the uncertainty is whether “In British” and “Occupation” were done separately or together. Stamps are known where “In British” is present and “Occupation” is missing, or vice-versa, which suggests four is the correct number. There is also disagreement as to whether each operation covered just one stamp, or some larger number. Cox does explicitly say each stamp was treated “separately” in the quote above. Khalastchy, from his close review of the material, thinks it is possible, but has so far not been proven, that some overprints could have covered two stamps at once.⁴⁵

Cockrill, also, disagrees that a stamp was used to obliterate the crescent. In his opinion, “careful examination of a number of actual examples” shows that the crescent was “painted out by hand.” ⁴⁶ I pass this on without comment.

The stamps

Aesthetically these are tremendously good. The roughness of the overprint produces a striking effect – Cockrill, with justice, calls them “probably the crudest surcharges ever made in the name of Great Britain, even in wartime.”⁴⁷

Twenty-five “major number” stamps were issued, plus varieties and errors. Eleven more stamps were produced but, as their amounts each failed to exceed Cox’s desired sixty, they weren’t issued. The most prolific of these stamps has fifteen known specimens, and the least just one.⁴⁸

The selection here is fairly cursory, and a couple are in noticeably sub-optimal condition, in the interests of not taxing my budget too much. The purple two annas I picked up for, if memory serves, five pounds sterling (2015 prices), which would be a tremendous bargain in any event; but for me, as a novice, the value of having a genuine overprint to which I could refer for future purchases was also considerable.

Sale of the stamps

In a futile attempt at preventing speculation, some sort of limitation was put on how many Baghdads each person could buy at the post office. The exact nature of this limitation is unclear. The classic account comes from Squadron-Leader Ennis, who claimed that initially each customer could only make one purchase (presumably of no maximum size) of Baghdads. This was then changed to a system where each customer could only purchase stamps worth up to 8 annas, and the purchase had to be signed for. Very charmingly, the post office apparently kept matchboxes containing a random assortment of stamps totalling 8 annas behind the counter, for the benefit of patrons wishing to buy the full allotment.⁴⁹ Khalastchy, having looked into the matter, can find no corroborating evidence for Ennis’ account, but considers it likely in view of numerous covers existing where the franking totals 8 annas.⁵⁰ A less likely account, quoted in Khalastchy, is that each customer was only allowed to buy one of each of the twenty-five varieties.⁵¹

The conventional understanding is that only the Baghdad head office sold the stamps – Cockrill, without citing a source, claims that the stamps were also available at “local post offices”.⁵² This I think must be completely wrong as, if Proud be correct, the head office was the only operational post office in the entire vilayet through 1917.⁵³

Whatever the system was, it did not work – a small, interesting issue like this was obviously destined to increase in value, and in only a few days’ time most of the stamps had been sold.⁵⁴ Khalastchy writes that “the vast majority of the known covers are philatelic”, and no doubt the vast majority of sales, in general, were to collectors and speculators.⁵⁵

Amusingly, the officer whom Cox had entrusted with collecting the stamps for overprinting was in India on leave when the stamps were issued, and by the time he returned to Baghdad they were sold out.⁵⁶

The King

George V’s walk-on role in the genesis of the Baghdads has been mentioned above. Cox prepared several presentation sets of the stamps for the King, along with a note describing their production (use of which I have made in writing this), and put this in the post on 15 September.⁵⁷ The package, for whatever reason, didn’t arrive until 23 November. ⁵⁸ The King was most displeased by this delay: an internal India Office memo dated 6 November reads “…the King is again asking about his stamps, which –H.M. says– can now be purchased at London stamp-dealers.”⁵⁹

Forgeries

These stamps, as an inevitable result of their rarity, interest and crudity, have been forged extensively. Fakes were being sold in Baghdad as early as December 1918⁶⁰ and are commonly encountered today. While some are much better than others, I don’t think any are tremendously hard to spot – the genuine overprints have certain characteristics in certain of the letters that I’ve never seen convincingly imitated.

Appendix – did Cox have a hand in the “Bushire under British Occupation” stamps of 1915?

Between 6 August and 16 October 1915 the strategically-located port town of Bushehr in Persia was occupied by British forces. During their stay the British put out a series of Persian stamps crudely overprinted “BUSHIRE UNDER BRITISH OCCUPATION”. I can find nothing which positively states that Cox was involved with this exercise. However, I note the following:

1. By the time of the 1 April telegram Cox seems to have already had a fully-formed notion that stamps could be overprinted for propaganda purposes, and indeed he specifically cites the Bushire stamps. There’s no sense in the India Office papers of him arriving gradually at the idea.
2. Between 1904 and 1914 Cox was the British consul-general at …Bushire.⁶¹ He was in Iraq when the Bushire issue appeared, but no doubt he still corresponded with former colleagues in the latter place, and was capable of making his desires known.
3. We see from discussions relating to the occupation issue that in January 1918 Cox was well enough informed about the Bushire issue to know that an overprint on the Shah’s face had generated no negative reaction. ⁶² I assume the philatelic papers weren’t effectively circulating in Iraq in the middle of the War, and so possessing this knowledge would require a certain amount of effort and active interest, which to my mind suggests some personal involvement.

But this is all speculation.

1. De Gaury, 36.
2. Wilson, 234. He gives a different account of how the street came about, incidentally.
3. Proud, 171; Cockrill, 8. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 249r.
4. Proud, 171.
5. Proud, 172.
6. Proud, 172.
7. Proud, 172. The question of when other civil post offices appeared in Baghdad (city) is a slightly obscure one. Proud explicitly says that the head office remained the only post office "throughout 1917", implying others appeared shortly afterwards. However, reviewing the list of postmarks and their earliest known uses in Proud, it would seem that the first Baghdad sub-offices didn't open until March 1920. Fair enough, if so, but in a 30 November 1917 telegram Cox alluded to other civil post offices within the city (see next page), and Cockrill was of the view that the Baghdad stamps were distributed to sub-offices, which of course presupposes the existence of sub-offices to receive them. In the absence of more positive evidence I have assumed there were no sub-offices in 1917.
8. Proud, 172.
9. The Geographical Journal, Major-General Sir Percy Zachariah Cox (1937), 1.
10. See next page.
11. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 272r.
12. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 229r.
13. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 226r.
14. The logic here is slightly tricky to reconstruct from the papers, but the concern seems to have been that visual signs of Baghdad vilayet being treated like Basra vilayet could be construed as violating the spirit of Maude’s 20 March “Baghdad for the Arabs” proclamation.
15. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 226r.
16. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 227r.
17. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 224r.
18. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 213r.
19. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 208r.
20. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 271r.
21. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 268r.
22. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 264r.
23. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1 267v-267r.
24. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1 267r. The note by Cecil Kinch at bottom.
25. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 221r. Cox corrected them shortly afterwards, Pt 1 220r.
26. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 263r
27. Khalastchy, 22.
28. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 210r-210v.
29. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 218r.
30. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 219r.
31. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 172r.
32. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 210r-210v.
33. Wilson, 321.
34. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 249r.
35. Wilson, 321.
36. Wilson, 321.
37. Wilson, 321. There were also 464 stamped envelopes (Wilson, 322).
38. Wilson, 321.
39. Wilson, 321. Cockrill at 25 quotes Robson Lowe catalogues which say sixty-five.
40. Wilson, 321.
41. Wilson, 321.
42. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 171r.
43. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 250r.
44. Cockrill, 9.
45. Khalastchy, 39.
46. Cockrill, 9.
47. Cockrill, 9.
48. Khalastchy covers these comprehensively at 91-116.
49. As cited in Khalastchy, 303. Ennis was apparently in Mesopotamia at the time, though where specifically he was in September 1917 I do not know.
50. Khalastchy, 303-307.
51. Khalastchy, 31.
52. Cockrill, 9.
53. Proud, 172.
54. Khalastchy, 30.
55. Khalastchy, 145.
56. Khalastchy, 30.
57. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 248r.
58. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 248r.
59. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 258r.
60. Khalastchy, 30.
61. Geographical Journal, 2.
62. India Office File 1323/1917, Part 1, 153r.